Abstract-A learning rule is completely uncoupled if each player's behavior is conditioned only on his own realized payoffs, and does not need to know the actions or payoffs of anyone else. We demonstrate a simple, completely uncoupled learning rule such that, in any finite normal form game with generic payoffs, the players' realized strategies implements a Pareto optimal coarse correlated (Hannan) equilibrium a very high proportion of the time. A variant of the rule implements correlated equilibrium a very high proportion of the time.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper builds on a recent literature that seeks to identify learning rules that lead to equilibrium without the usual assumptions of perfect rationality and common knowledge. Of particular interest are learning rules that are simple to implement and require a minimum degree of information about what others in the population are doing. Such rules can be viewed as models of behavior in games with many dispersed agents and very limited observability. They also have practical application to the design of distributed control systems, where the agents can be designed to respond to their environment in ways that lead to desirable system-wide outcomes.
One can distinguish between various classes of learning rules depending on the amount of information they require. A rule is uncoupled if it does not require any knowledge of the payoffs of the other players [2] . A rule is completely uncoupled if it does not require any knowledge of the actions or payoffs of the other players [3] . The latter paper identifies a family of completely uncoupled learning rules that come close to Nash equilibrium (pure or mixed) with high probability in two-person normal form games with generic payoffs. Subsequently, [4] showed that similar results hold for n-person normal form games with generic payoffs. Lastly, [5] exhibited a much simpler class of completely uncoupled rules that lead to Nash equilibrium in weakly acyclic games. These learning algorithms all have the feature that agents occasionally experiment with new strategies, which they adopt if they lead to higher realized payoffs.
In [6] , this approach was further developed by making an agent's search behavior dependent on his mood (an internal state variable). Changes in mood are triggered by changes in realized payoffs relative to the agent's current aspiration level. Rules of this nature can be designed that select pure Nash equilibria in any normal form game with generic This research was supported by AFOSR grant #FA9550-12-1-0359, ONR grant #N00014-12-1-0643, and NSF Grant #ECCS-1351866. The full version of this manuscript can be found in [1] .
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payoffs that has at least one pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover the rule can be designed so that it selects a Pareto optimal pure Nash equilibrium [7] or even a Pareto optimal action profile (irrespective of whether this action profile is a pure Nash equilibrium) [8] .
There is a quite different class of learning dynamics that leads to coarse correlated equilibrium (alternatively correlated equilibrium). These rules are based on the concept of no-regret. They can be formulated so that they depend only on a player's own realized payoffs, that is, they are completely uncoupled [9] - [11] . However, while the resulting dynamics converge almost surely to the set of correlated equilibria, they do not necessarily converge to -or even approximate -correlated equilibrium behavior at a given point in time.
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate a class of completely uncoupled learning rules that bridges these two approaches. In overall structure the rules are similar to the learning dynamics introduced in [6] - [8] , [12] . Like the no-regret rules, our approach selects (coarse) correlated equilibria instead of Nash equilibria. Unlike no-regret learning, however, our rule 'leads to' equilibrium in the sense that players' strategies actually constitute a coarse correlated equilibrium a high proportion of the time. In fact, as a bonus, they constitute a Pareto optimal coarse correlated equilibrium a high proportion of the time. 1 It is important to highlight that there have been great strides in developing polynomial-time algorithms for computing (coarse) correlated equilibria, e.g., [13] - [16] . The starting point associated with these algorithms is a complete representation of the game. Unfortunately, the applicability of these algorithms to the design of distributed control systems is limited as such representations are typically not available. Hence, the focus of this paper is on identifying distributed algorithms where agents can learn to play an efficient (coarse) correlated equilibrium under less stringent informational demands.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let G be a finite strategic-form game with n agents. The set of agents is denoted by N := {1, ..., n}. Each agent i ∈ N has a finite action set A i and a utility function U i : A → R, where A = A 1 ×· · ·×A n denotes the joint action set. We shall henceforth refer to a finite strategic-form game simply as "a game." For any joint distribution q = {q a } a∈A ∈ ∆(A) where ∆(A) denotes the simplex over the joint action set A, we extend the definition of an agent's utility function in the usual fashion
The set of coarse correlated equilibria can then be characterized by the set of joint distributions CCE ⊆ ∆(A) where q ∈ CCE if for all i ∈ N and a i ∈ A i a∈A
It is well-known that the set of coarse correlated equilibrium is non-empty.
In this paper we focus on the derivation of learning rules that provide convergence to an efficient coarse correlated equilibria of the form q * ∈ arg max q∈CCE i∈N
To that end, we consider the framework of repeated one-shot game where a given game G is repeated once each period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }. In period t, the agents simultaneously choose actions a(t) = (a 1 (t), ..., a n (t)) and receive payoffs U i (a(t)). Agent i ∈ N chooses the action a i (t) according to a probability distribution p i (t) ∈ ∆(A i ), which we refer to as the strategy of agent i at time t. We adopt the convention that p ai i (t) is the probability that agent i selects action a i at time t according to the strategy p i (t). Here, an agent's strategy at time t can only rely on observations from the one-shot games played at times {0, 1, 2, ..., t − 1}. Different learning algorithms are specified by the agents' available information and the mechanism by which their strategies are updated as information is gathered. Here, we focus on one of the most informationally restrictive class of learning rules, termed completely uncoupled or payoff-based, where agents only have access to: (i) the action they played and (ii) the payoff they received. More formally, the strategy adjustment mechanism of agent i takes the form
Recent work has shown that for finite games with generic payoffs, there exist completely uncoupled learning rules that lead to Pareto optimal Nash equilibria [7] and also Pareto optimal action profile irrespective of whether or not they are a pure Nash equilibrium [8] ; see also [6] , [17] , [18] . Here, we exhibit a different class of learning procedures that lead to efficient coarse correlated equilibria.
III. ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
We will now introduce a payoff based learning algorithm which ensures that the agents' collective behavior will constitute a coarse correlated equilibrium that maximizes the sum of the players' average payoffs with high probability. In the forthcoming algorithm, each agent will commit to playing a sequence of actions as opposed to just a single action when faced with a decision. More specifically, the set of possible "sequenced" actions for agent i will be represented by the set A i = ∪ k=1,...,w A k i where w represents the maximum length of a sequence of actions that any agent will play and A k i defines all action sequences of length k for agent i. Accordingly, if agent i commits to playing a sequence of actions a i ∈ A i of length l i = | a i | ≤ w at time t, then the resulting sequence of play for agent i is
. . . = . . .
The following algorithm follows the theme of [6] where an agent's search behavior is dependent on his mood (an internal state variable). Changes in mood are triggered by changes in realized payoffs relative to the agent's current aspiration level. In the following, we provide an informal description of the forthcoming algorithm. We divide the algorithm into two parts, agent dynamics and state dynamics, for a more fluid presentation.
Agent Dynamics: At any given time, the specific action that agent i plays at time t > 0, i.e., a i (t), is determined solely by the agent's local state variable, which we represent by x i (t). The details of this state variable will be described in detail in the ensuing section. Since the agents commit to playing action sequences, most of the times the specific action played will merely be the component of the action sequence that is to come next. At the end of an action sequence, each agent has the opportunity to revise his strategy and select a new action sequence. Here, each agent has an internal state variable (content (C), discontent (D), hopeful (H), and watchful (W)) which governs this process in the following way.
-First, each agent has a baseline action sequence and a baseline utility. Roughly speaking, each agent presumes that the average utility attained by playing this baseline action sequence will be the baseline utility. When this is true, we say that the baseline action sequence and baseline utility are aligned.
-When an agent is content, the agent will select his baseline action sequence with high probability. Occasionally, the agent will experiment with a "constant" action sequence of the same length as his baseline action sequence.
-When an agent is discontent, the agent will select an action sequence of arbitrary length.
-When an agent is hopeful or watchful, an agent will repeat his baseline action sequence with certainty. Hopeful and watchful are intermediate states that are triggered when the realized average utility does not match the baseline utility. Hence, the agent enters an intermediate mode where he waits to get a better observation before overreacting. State Dynamics: At any given time, the state of each agent i, i.e., x i (t + 1), will be updated using only information regarding the previous state x i (t), the decision of agent i at time t, i.e., a i (t), and the utility of agent i at time t, i.e., U i (a(t)). As with the agent dynamics, the key state components will only change when an agent has completed a given action sequence. The key component of the state dynamics will be deriving how each agent's mood changes as a function of the (i) baseline utility and the (ii) the average utility received over the previously played action sequence. Roughly speaking, the process can be described as follows:
-A player switches from content to discontent for sure if his average utility is below his baseline utility for several periods in a row and he was not experimenting. He may also switch spontaneously from content to discontent with a very small probability even if this is not the case.
-A player switches from discontent to content with a probability that is an increasing function of his current average payoff (in which case he takes the previous action sequence and its realized average payoff as his new baseline).
-The details associated with the intermediate states hopeful and watchful will be spelled out later. Their role will become clear when we give the learning rule in detail.
A. Notation
At each point in time, the action of agent i ∈ N can be represented by the tuple [ a i , a i ], where
• Agent i's current action is a i ∈ a i . At each point in time an agent's state can be represented by the tuple 
B. Formal Algorithm Description
We divide the dynamics into the following two parts: the agent dynamics and the state dynamics. Without loss of generality we shall focus on the case where agent utility functions are strictly bounded between 0 and 1, i.e., for any agent i ∈ N and action profile a ∈ A we have 1 > U i (a) ≥ 0. Lastly, we define a constant c > n which will be utilized in the following algorithm.
Agent Dynamics: Fix an experimentation rate > 0. The dynamics for agent i only rely on the state of agent i at that given time. Let
] be the state of agent i at time t. For the following dynamics, each agent only has the opportunity to change strategies at the beginning of a planning window. Accordingly, if k i > 1 then
where a i (k i ) denotes the k i -th component of the vector a i . If k i = 1, then a player makes a decision based on the player's underlying mood: -Content (m i = C): In this state, the agent chooses a sequence of actions a i ∈ A i according to the following probability distribution
where
for some a i ∈ A i , and |A i | represents the cardinality of the set A i . The action is then chosen as a i (t) = a i (1; t) where a i (1; t) denotes the first component of the vector a i (t).
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-Discontent (m i = D): In this state, the agent chooses a sequence of actions a i according to the following probability distribution:
Note that the baseline action and utility play no role in the agent dynamics when the agent is discontent. The action is then chosen as a i (t) = a i (1; t).
In either of these states, the agent selects his trial action sequence, i.e.,
Note that the first component of the state vector corresponds to the current trial action. Hence, the agent dynamics update purely this component of the state vector.
State Dynamics: First, the majority of the state components only change at the end of a sequence of actions. Let
] be the state of agent i at time t, a i = a i (t) be the action sequence played at time t, a i (t) = a i (k i ) be the action that agent i played at time t, and U i (a(t)) be the utility player i received at time t. If
Otherwise, if k i = | a i | then the state is updated according to the underlying mood as follows: For shorthand notation, we define the running average of the payoff over the trial actions as
], the state of agent i is updated as
i , the state of agent i is updated as
) is randomly selected from the set {w + 1, . . . , w n + w} with uniform probability.
The new state is determined by the 3 The need for this repetition arises from the fact that each of the agents could be playing action sequences of distinct lengths. The purpose of this repetition will become more clear during the proof. transition
-Hopeful (m i = H): First, it is important to highlight that if the mood of any player i ∈ N is hopeful then a i = a b i . The new state is determined as follows: If c
is randomly selected from the set {w + 1, . . . , w n + w} with uniform probability.
where n H i is randomly selected from the set {w+1, . . . , w n + w} with uniform probability.
IV. MAIN RESULT
Before stating the main result we introduce a bit of notation. Let X = i X i denote the full set of states of the players where X i is the set of possible states for player i. For a given state x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) where
, define the ensuing sequence of baseline actions as follows: for every k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . } and agent i ∈ N we have
| with the understanding that this implies the component
We express the sequence of joint action profiles by a(k|x) = (a 1 (k|x 1 ), . . . , a n (k|x n )). Define the average payoff over the forthcoming periods (provided that all players play according to their baseline action) for any player i ∈ N and period l ∈ {1, 2, . . . } as
We will characterize the above dynamics by analyzing the empirical distribution of the joint distribution. To that end, define the empirical distribution of the joint actions associated with the baseline sequence of actions for a given state x by q(x) = {q a (x)} a∈A ∈ ∆(A) where
where I{·} represents the usual indicator function and the equality derives from the fact that players are repeating finite sequence of actions which ensures that for any k ∈ {0, 1, . . . } we have
Define the set of states which induce coarse correlated equilibria through repeated play of the baseline sequence of actions as
Lastly, define the set of states X * ⊆ X CCE which induce coarse correlated equilibria and are aligned, i.e., x ∈ X * if x ∈ X CCE and
The process described above can be characterized as a finite Markov chain parameterized by an exploration rate > 0. The following theorem characterizes the support of the limiting stationary distribution, whose elements are referred to as the stochastically stable states [19] . More precisely, a state x ∈ X is stochastically stable if and only if lim →0 + µ(x, ) > 0 where µ(x, ) is a stationary distribution of the process P for a fixed > 0. Our characterization requires a mild degree of genericity in the agents' utility functions, which is summarized by the following notion of interdependence as introduced in [6] .
Definition 4.1 (Interdependence): An n-person game G on the finite action space A is interdependent if, for every a ∈ A and every proper subset of agents J ⊂ N , there exists an agent i / ∈ J and a choice of actions
Theorem 4.1: Let G be an finite interdependent game and suppose all players follow the above dynamics. If X * = ∅, then a state x ∈ X is stochastically stable if and only if x ∈ X * and i∈N u i (0|x) = max
If X * = ∅, then a state x ∈ X is stochastically stable if and 4 Note that in general the set X * need not be empty. Define the set Q as
A sufficient condition for X * to be non-empty is that Q ∩ CCE is nonempty.
only if
This theorem demonstrates that as the exploration rates → 0 + , the process will spend most of the time at the efficient coarse correlated equilibrium provided that the (discretized) set of coarse correlated equilibria in nonempty. If this set is empty, then the process will spend most of the time at the action profile which maximizes the sum of the agent's payoffs. We prove this theorem using the theory of resistance tree for regular perturbed processes developed in [20] .
V. OVERVIEW OF PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1 Let X i denote the set of admissible states for agent i. The above dynamics induce a Markov process over the finite state space X = i∈N X i . We shall denote the transition probability matrix by P for each > 0. Computing the stationary distribution of this process is challenging because of the large number of states and the fact that the underlying process is not reversible. Accordingly, we shall focus on characterizing the support of the limiting stationary distribution, whose elements are referred to as the stochastically stable states [19] . More precisely, a state x ∈ X is stochastically stable if and only if lim →0 + µ(x, ) > 0 where µ(x, ) is a stationary distribution of the process P for a fixed > 0.
The proof of the above theorem encompasses two major parts. The first part involves characterizing the recurrence classes of the unperturbed process. The unperturbed process is the process induced by = 0. The importance of the first part of the proof centers on the fact that the stochastically stable states are contained in the recurrence classes of the unperturbed process. The second part of the proof involves characterizing the limiting behavior of the process using the theory of resistance trees for regular perturbed processes [20] . In particular, the theory of resistance trees provides a graph-theoretic tool for evaluating which of the recurrence classes are stochastically stable.
The complete proof can be found in the full version of this manuscript in [1] VI. CONCLUSION The results in this paper demonstrate that specific forms of correlated behavior can be attained through distributed learning rules with no explicit communication between the agents. While the players long run behavior is shown to be consistent with the most efficient coarse correlated equilibria, it is important to highlight that this results does not imply that the players' joint strategy at any given time constitutes an efficient coarse correlated equilibrium. Future work, as in [12] , will focus on bridging this gap.
